Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 8
Number 1 Fall 1980

Article 6

1-1-1980

Justice Rehnquist: First Amendment Speech in the
Labor Context
Robert C. Lind Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert C. Lind Jr., Justice Rehnquist: First Amendment Speech in the Labor Context, 8 Hastings Const. L.Q. 93 (1980).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol8/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Justice Rehnquist: First

Amendment Speech in the Labor
Context
By ROBERT C. LiND, JR.*

Introduction
William H. Rehnquist, the 100th justice of the United States
Supreme Court, is a man with rather predictable judicial tendencies which clearly result from his well defined and articulated jurisprudential beliefs. Though he has written a surprisingly limited
number of "traditional" labor law opinions during his tenure on
the Supreme Court, those that he has written are consistent with
his general legal philosophy. These opinions are a microcosm of
Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence.
It is too simplistic to view Justice Rehnquist as totally result-

oriented, voting his political philosophy by deciding against "Big
Government" and labor unions at every available opportunity. Although his opinions and voting record have been evaluated so as to
show such a pattern in his decisions,1 this is to be expected from
any person operating from a well-defined legal and constitutional
* B.E.S., University of Minnesota, 1976; J.D., George Washington University, 1979.
Currently Lecturer in Law and University Fellow in Law, The National Law Center, George
Washington University.
1. See Ulmer & Stookey, 'Nixon's Legacy to the Supreme Court: A StatisticalAnalysis of Judicial Behavior,' 3 FLA. ST. L. Rxv. 331 (1975); Schultz & Howard, The Myth of
Swing Voting: An Analysis of Voting Patterns on the Supreme Court, 50 N.Y.U.L. Rnv.
798 (1975); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. Rzv. 293
(1976). "A review of all the cases in which Justice Rehnquist has taken part indicates that
his votes are guided by three basic propositions: (1) Conflicts between an individual and the
government should, whenever possible, be resolved against the individual; (2) Conflicts between state and federal authority, whether on an executive, legislative or judicial level,
should, whenever possible, be resolved in favor of the states; and (3) Questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction, whether on the district court, appellate court or Supreme Court
level, should, whenever possible, be resolved against such exercise." Id. at 294 (footnotes
omitted).
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philosophy.
Simple result analysis could possibly permit a study which is
result-oriented itself. More properly, an examination of Justice
Rehnquist's application of the First Amendment in labor cases
must be centered on those elements of his philosophy which come
into play in the labor-management relations area.
As will be shown below, the most important elements of Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence are his consistent focus on federalism, his belief in textual interpretation, and his utilitarian application of the First Amendment in specific contexts.
Federalism in Justice Rehnquist's Labor Opinions
Justice Rehnquist views the Constitution as creating an implicit ordering of relationships within the federal system, an order
necessary to make the Constitution a workable governing charter.
It is this view which forms the basis of his constitutional philosophy.2 Justice Rehnquist accepts the view expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison s that while the people retain
ultimate sovereignty, they have ceded certain well-defined powers
to the national government. These powers are strictly proscriptive,
consisting of "thou shall not's" rather than "thou shall's." Any
other powers have been denied to the national and state governments.4 This view of the constitutional plan places tension between
the national and state governments, as well as between the people
and those governments.5
Because state and local elected bodies are considered by the
Justice as more responsive to the commands of the people, state
and local government must be protected from the power of the federal government, of which Justice Rehnquist is wary.6 It is for this
reason that he is reluctant to put restrictions on state power and
frequently defers matters to the states,7 although it cannot be de2. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 432 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (article I
and the Eleventh Amendment protect state sovereignty from involuntary suit in a foreign
state).
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tax. L. REv. 693, 696 (1976).
6. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissentin)(Justice Rehnquist begins his dissent with a reference to George Orwell's 1984).
7. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 401 (1979) (White, J., joined by Burger,
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nied that the conservatism of state power mirrors his own political
philosophy."
These federalist concerns were the basis for Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,9
which held that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act,1 0 concerning minimum wage and maximum hour provisions,
could not be applied to employees of state governments. Such congressional action was seen as an abrogation of an undefined, but
unified, constitutional principle guaranteeing the independent existence and sovereignty of state and local governments.
The majority opinion was built upon the rationale of Justice
Rehnquist's earlier dissent in Fry v. United States.,, There he argued that the states possess an inherent affirmative constitutional
limitation on congressional power which precludes the application
of wage-freeze legislation to state employees.
Both [the Tenth and Eleventh] Amendments are simply examples of the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the
Constitution that the States were sovereign in many respects, and
that although their legislative authority could be superseded by
Congress in many areas where Congress was competent to act,
Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it
were just another individual or business enterprise subject to
regulation.12
In National League of Cities v. Usery, Justice Rehnquist continued to assert a kind of "natural law" of states' rights, strongly
at odds with his legal positivist philosophy. 8 He held that the statC.J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
8. Justice Rehnquist served as the chief aide to Barry Goldwater during his 1964 Presidential campaign. Address by Robert B. Chatz to the Southern District Regional Members
of.the Commercial Law League of America (Jan. 1, 1978), reprinted in 83 CoM. L.J. 121
(1978).
9. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (West Supp. 1980).
11. 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13. It is Justice Rehnquist's philosophy that rights arise only from positive law, constitutional or statutory. "If [a democratic] society adopts a constitution and incorporates in
that constitution safeguards for individual liberty, these safeguards indeed do take on a
generalized moral rightness or goodness. They assume a general social acceptance neither
because of any intrinsic worth nor because of any unique origins in someone's idea of natural justice but instead simply because they have been incorporated in a constitution by the
people. Within the limits of our Constitution, the representatives of the people in the execu-
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utory amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act exceeded congressional power under the commerce clause because they directly
displaced the states' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, thereby violating the
Tenth Amendment.1 The undefined limitations of state sovereignty were held not to be delegated to the national government.
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States'
power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom
they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions,
what hours those persons will work, and what compensation will
be provided
where these employees may be called upon to work
15
overtime.

The Court found that the imposition of minimum wage and
maximum hours would significantly alter or displace the states'
abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in areas
such as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health,
and parks and recreation. These activities were held to be typical
of those performed by state and local governments in administering the law and furnishing public services."6
Justice Rehnquist determined that these traditional functions
were of the type which governments were created to provide. The
1974 Fair Labor Standards Act amendments, however, by making
some of these functions economically prohibitive, took away the
tive branches of the state and national governments enact laws. The laws that emerge after
a typical political struggle in which various individual value judgments are debated likewise
take on a form of moral goodness because they have been enacted into positive law. It is the
fact of their enactment that gives them whatever moral claim they have upon us as a society, however, and not any independent virtue they may have in any particular citizen's own
scale of values." Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 704 (1976). See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Justice Stevens has stated the contrary position in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229
(Stevens, J., dissenting): "If man were a creature of the State, the analysis would be correct.
But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty which the
Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on the
power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The relevant state laws either
create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of the citizen who must live in an ordered
society. Of course, law is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a
complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source." Id.
at 230.
14. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
15. 426 U.S. at 845.
16. Id. at 851.
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state control. "Quite apart from the substantial costs imposed
upon the States and their political subdivisions, the Act displaces
state policies regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of those governmental services which their citizens
1

require."'

7

It was this impairment of the states' control over traditional
functions which concerned the Justice. "If Congress may withdraw
from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of these
functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the
States' 'separate and independent existence."" 8
He therefore propounded an essential function test. Under the
test, if regulated state functions are found to be "functions essential to separate and independent existence,"' 19 they are considered
attributes of state sovereignty which may not be impaired by Congress. The states' power to determine the wages, hours and overtime pay of employees who carry out governmental functions was
found to be such an attribute of state sovereignty.
National League of Cities v. Usery proved to be the pinnacle
of the Court's acceptance of Justice Rehnquist's view of states'
rights. The essential function test has subsequently remained
dormant.20

Federalism and the NLRB
Justice Rehnquist's strong belief in federalism can be seen in
his decisions concerning the National Labor Relations Board.
While Justice Rehnquist tends to give a great deal of deference to
administrative agencies, 2 ' he views them within the context of the
17. Id. at 847.
18. Id. at 851 (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
20. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.). In sustaining Congress' power to enforce the equal protection clause under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
a state was held subject to suit for damages for sex discrimination involving state employees
under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972; no consideration was made of the
"attributes of state sovereignty."
21. "[A] consistent and contemporaneous construction of a statute by the agency
charged with its enforcement is entitled to great deference by the courts." NLRB v. Boeing
Co., 412 U.S. 67, 75 (1973). This deference may be due, in part, to the Justice's interest in
administrative law prior to his appointment to the Court. At the time of his nomination he
was serving as a member of the Council of the Administrative Conference of the United
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constitutional scheme of federalism. This means that the power of
the NLRB, as an agency of the federal government, is to be strictly
construed.
In several of his labor opinions, Justice Rehnquist attempts to
limit the involvement of the National Labor Relations Board. For
example, in his first labor opinion, NLRB v. Burns International
Security Services, Inc.,22 Justice Rehnquist concurred with the
majority's holding that a "successor" employer was not required to
assume a collective bargaining agreement reached by the prior employer and the certified union. However, he felt it necessary to dissent from the majority's conclusion that the successor employer,
Burns, was under a statutory obligation to bargain with the union,
the United Plant Guards. His dissent was grounded on his finding
there was no evidence that a majority of Burns' present employees
wanted the United Plant Guards as their bargaining representative, or that the particular group of employees constituted the appropriate bargaining unit in light of the fact that Burns regularly
transferred employees from job to job and had never bargained
with a union consisting of employees at a single location.2
Justice Rehnquist attacked the application of the successorship doctrine, which requires the new employer to recognize and
bargain with the existing union representative,24 as inapplicable to
the Burns case.2 5 The Burns Company had successfully bid against

the previous supplier of contracted security services. Although
Burns retained most of the employees of the previous supplier,
Justice Rehnquist maintained that Burns was more of a "competitor" than a "successor," particularly in view of the fact that Burns
had acquired no assets, by negotiation or transfer, from the previous employer. He therefore concluded that the successorship docStates and was also a member of the Council of the Section of Administrative Law of the
American Bar Association. Rehnquist, Luncheon with Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 26 AD. L.
REV. 419 (1974).
His expertise was brought to bear in IT&T v. Local 134, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, 419 U.S. 428 (1975), where Justice Rehnquist, for a unanimous Court,
decided a technical question concerning the adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions of the
National Labor Relations Board in a § 10(k) jurisdictional dispute hearing and its compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
22. 406 U.S. 272, 296 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Id. at 297-98 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
25. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 25455 (1974).
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trine was inappropriate because it would "undercut the principle
of free choice of bargaining representatives by the employees and
designation of the appropriate bargaining unit by the Board that
are guaranteed by the Act."2
Because Justice Rehnquist is extremely protective of the constitutionally balanced federal system,27 he has taken a restrictive
view of the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction. Although "a judicially perceived need to leave to the National Labor
Relations Board the adjudicative development of the law controlling labor relations has resulted in extensive preemption of legislative and judicial state action in the field, ' 28 the Justice has generally attempted to limit the scope of preemption in the labor law
29
area.
Another example of Justice Rehnquist's limitation of the
NLRB's jurisdiction is found in NLRB v. Boeing Co.30 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that the question of whether
a fine imposed upon a union member for crossing a picket line was
so large as to be coercive was a matter for state courts to determine, upon the basis of the state law of contracts or voluntary associations. The basis for this decision was the lack of congressional
concern for the imposition by unions of fines not affecting the employer-employee relationship. "Congress had not intended ... to
regulate the internal affairs of unions to the extent that would be
required in order to base unfair labor practice charges on the levying of such fines. '3 1 Thus, while the NLRB had authority under
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Acte2 to review
26. 406 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "I believe that a careful analysis of the.., concept of successorship indicates that important
rights of both the employee and the employer to independently order their own affairs are
sacrificed needlessly by the application of that doctrine to this case." Id. at 299.
27. See notes 2-8 and accompanying text supra.
28. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 623, 635 (1975). This note presents a concise discussion of
the history of labor law preemption.
29. Justice Rehnquist has also attempted to limit preemption in other areas. See, e.g.,
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting from the Court's holding that a federal aviation regulation preempted the
city's curfew on late night flights, rejected the notion that preemption could be founded
upon the implied intent of Congress, stating that a strict intent to preempt on the part of
Congress must be shown.
30. 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
31. Id. at 73.
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1980).

100
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the reasonableness of union rules affecting employment status, its
general lack of jurisdiction over internal union affairs prohibited
its testing of the reasonableness of rules affecting membership status not otherwise prohibited by the Act.
Justice Rehnquist also refused to apply the preemption doctrine against state courts in Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American
Radio Association3 and American Radio Association v. Mobile
Steamship Association." In both cases, Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court, upheld a state court injunction forbidding peaceful
picketing to protest labor standards aboard a foreign vessel with
an alien crew in an American port. The preemption arguments
were rejected because, although the union activity was directed towards increasing American wage rates by reducing the competitive
advantage enjoyed by the owners of foreign flag ships due to low
labor costs, Justice Rehnquist found an insufficient showing that
the picketing would in any way affect interstate commerce. State
jurisdiction was therefore not preempted.
Recent cases continue to demonstrate Justice Rehnquist's propensity for denying jurisdiction to the NLRB. In Lodge 76, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 5 Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Stevens'
dissent from the Court's decision striking down as preempted the
state regulation of self-help remedies, in this case a concerted refusal to work overtime, which were neither expressly protected nor
expressly prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act. The majority held that "Congress meant that these activities, whether of
employer or employees, were not to be regulable by States any
more than the NLRB, for neither States nor the Board is 'afforded
flexibility in picking and choosing which economic devices of labor
and management shall be branded as unlawful."' 3 6 The dissent argued that there existed no legislative intent to leave partial strike
activity wholly unregulated, nor was there any evidence that Congress had addressed the question of partial strike activity. 7 Justice
Stevens concluded his opinion by stating that he was not persuaded that partial strike activity was so essential to the bargain33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

415 U.S. 104 (1974).
419 U.S. 215 (1974).
427 U.S. 132 (1976).
Id. at 149 (citation omitted).
Id. at 157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ing process that the states should be prohibited from making such
activity illegal.3 8
Justice Rehnquist also joined Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of
Labor, 9 which held that Congress had intended to leave the states
free to decide whether or not strikers should be disqualified from
unemployment compensation. In language somewhat reminiscent
of National League of Cities v. Usery,'0 the Court found that the
state provision constituted a law of general applicability which
protected interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility. ' 41 The law was viewed as comprising part of the federal-state

scheme which grants the states considerable discretion in setting
eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits.42 Therefore, it was
entitled to a presumption of validity to be overcome
only by "com43
pelling congressional direction" to the contrary.
Justice Rehnquist also joined in the Court's opinion in NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago," which held that schools operated
by a church, teaching both religious and secular subjects, are not
within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. The majority saw a significant risk of the infringement of the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the First Amendment if the National Labor Relations
Act was found to confer jurisdiction over church-operated schools.
In analyzing the language of the Act and its legislative history,
the Court found no affirmative intention by the Congress to grant
jurisdiction to the NLRB over church-operated schools. The majority, noting congressional sensitivity to First Amendment guarantees, found that the required explicit congressional intent to infringe upon constitutional rights was not present, therefore,
[i]n the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent to bring
teachers in church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the
38. Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
40. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
41. 440 U.S. at 540 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
244 (1959)). See Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. Ray. 469 (1972), for a discussion of the attacks made on Garmon and its
possible re-emergence.
42. 440 U.S. at 536-40.
43. Id. at 540 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959)).
44. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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Board, we decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in
turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive ques-

tions arising45out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.
As has been shown, Justice Rehnquist's view of federalism, as
applied to administrative agencies, has become a dominant philosophy influencing many of his opinions concerning labor law.
Whether the application of its statutes is limited, as in Burns, or
its jurisdiction is held not to preempt state law, it is clear that the
National Labor
Relations Board is to take a nonexclusive role in
46
matters.
labor
Textualism in Justice Rehnquist's Labor Opinions
The second element often seen in Rehnquist's jurisprudence is
his textualistic view of the Constitution as a restricted grant of
power by the holder of ultimate sovereignty, the people. This view
pervades his reading of both the Constitution and statutory enactments allowed under that organic document.
Justice Rehnquist believes that the Framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were cognizant of the fact that they
were writing an instrument which was to guide the country for centuries. Therefore, they wrote keeping this objective in mind. The
specific system the Framers wanted and adopted, and the particular problems they wished resolved, were set forth in specific langnage which stated explicitly or implicitly'1 their intentions. In areas where the Framers realized that unforeseen matters would
have to be dealt with at a later time, they used more ambiguous
language.
This view follows the notion of an expandable Constitution ex45. Id. at 507.
46. See discussion of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
47. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This case
involved the issue whether Nevada could be sued unwillingly in the California state courts.

Justice Rehnquist discussed the Court's reliance "on notions of a constitutional plan-the
implicit ordering of relationships within the federal system necessary to make the Constitution a workable governing charter and to give each provision within that document the full
effect intended by the Framers. The tacit postulates yielded by [the implicit ordering of
relationships within the federal system] are as much engrained in the fabric of the document as its express provisions, because without them the Constitution is denied force and
often meaning." Id. (footnote omitted).
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pounded by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 4 8 General language
used by the Framers gives to those later interpreting the instrument latitude to apply the language to cases the Framers may not
have foreseen. Matters not at all contemplated by the Framers are
to be dealt with as questions of first impression. However, when
the Framers did not use general language, or when they dealt with
a topic of which they were cognizant, the interpretation given by
the authors must then be followed.' 9
Specific text within the Constitution and its amendments
must be given the full force of its language as understood by the
Framers. 50 The explicit enforcement provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment,51 for example, determines the precedence which certain congressional authority takes over state sovereignty.52
General text, within Justice Rehnquist's view of constitutional
construction, not only allows for a certain amount of latitude in
adapting the Constitution to a changing environment, but also allows philosophical differences to come to the fore.
The Constitution is in many of its parts obviously not a specifically worded document but one couched in general phraseology.
There is obviously wide room for honest difference of opinion
over the meaning of general phrases in the Constitution; any particular Justice's decision when a question arises under one of
these general phrases will depend
to some extent on his own phi53
losophy of constitutional law.
There must be limits placed on the interpretations given such
general language, however. They must correspond with the purpose
of the Framers in using such general or ambiguous language. Justice Rehnquist puts great emphasis on Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the Constitution because the latter wrote within the
brief interval following the deliberations of the Framers of the
Constitution at Philadelphia, and the debates over the ratification
48. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).

49. Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 694.
50. See Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's
Role in American Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1203-04, 1209 (1978) (Justice Rehnquist

is described as a textualist, who interprets the text of the Constitution in the light of any
clarifying original understanding of the Framers).
51. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."

52. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976).
53.

Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 697. See also Rehnquist, The Supreme Court of the

United States: The Ohio Connection, 4 U.

DAYTON

L. Rav. 271, 280 (1979).
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of the Constitution in the thirteen colonies.5 '
Justice Rehnquist also believes that general language should
be read with consistency, and preferably with deference to some
"central guiding principle."
If, during the period of more than a century since its adoption,
this Court had developed, a consistent body of doctrine which
could reasonably be said to expound the intent of those who
drafted and adopted [the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment], there would be no cause for judicial complaint, however unwise or incapable of effective administration
one might find those intentions. If, on the other hand, recognizing
that those who drafted and adopted this language had rather imprecise notions about what it meant, the Court had evolved a
body of doctrine which both was consistent and served some arguably useful purpose, there would likewise be little cause for
great dissatisfaction with the existing state of the law.
Unfortunately, more than a century of decisions under this
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have produced neither of
these results .... [T]he Court's decisions can fairly be described
as an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle. 55
As can be gathered from the dissent quoted above, Justice
Rehnquist's insistence upon the strict textual analysis of the Constitution and its amendments has caused him to reject the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the equal protection
clause. His interpretation of that clause would require that a rational basis test be used in equal protection cases which deal with
classifications based on gender,"6 alienage 57 or ilegitimacy, 58 be54. Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 697.
55. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224 (1977) (Justice Rehnquist dissenting
from Court decision which struck down a provision of the Social Security Act requiring a
surviving widower to prove his dependency on his deceased wife in order to claim a death
benefit, though widows were granted such benefits without proof of dependency on their
deceased husbands, stating the view that 'benign' gender classifications must also be analyzed by a mere rationality standard); Craig. v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Justice
Rehnquist dissenting from the Court's invalidation of an Oklahoma statute forbidding the
sale of 3.2 beer to males aged 18-20,. but allowing such sales to women 18 or older, which
under his view would have been upheld under a rational basis equal protection analysis.
"The only redeeming feature of the Court's opinion, to my mind, is that it apparently signals a retreat by those who joined the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), from their view that sex is a 'suspect' classification for purposes of equal protection analysis." 429 U.S. at 217); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975)(Justice
Rehnquist concurred in the result reached by the Court that a Social Security provision
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cause the Fourteenth Aniendment allows strict scrutiny only for
classifications based on race 59 or on national origin, "the first
granting benefits to a spouse of a deceased male wage earner, but not to the spouse of a
deceased female wage earner, was constitutionally impermissible, finding that the government's proffered legislative purpose was so totally at odds with the context and history of
the statute that it could not serve as a basis for judging whether the statutory distinction
between men and women rationally served a valid legislative objective; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Justice Rehnquist dissenting from the Court's decision invalidating a federal law which entitled married female members of the armed forces to greater
financial benefits only if they proved that their spouses were dependent, though imposing no
similar requirements on males; he cited the district judge's opinion in Frontiero v. Laird,
341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972), for the proposition that there existed a rational relationship between the classification and a legitimate governmental end); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (Justice Rehnquist joining a unanimous decision striking down an Idaho law
which gave preference to men over women as estate administrators on the ground it did not
"bear a rational relationship" to a legitimate state objective). But see Califano v. Westcott,
443 U.S. 76, 93 (1979) (Justice Rehnquist joining Justice Powell's opinion concurring in part
with the Court's holding that a section of the Social Security Act providing benefits to families whose dependent children lack parental support because of the unemployment of the
mother, was not substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective, and therefore unconstitutional).
57. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Rehnquist dissenting from the
Court's decision holding invalid a New York state law limiting scholarship grants to citizens,
and aliens who intended to become citizens); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973)
(Justice Rehnquist dissenting from the Court's decision invalidating as unconstitutional section 53 of the New York Civil Service Law, which provided for a general disqualification of
aliens for employment in the state's civil service, holding that the distinction between citizens and aliens was recognized by the Constitution. "[T]here is no language used in the
[14th] Amendment, or any historical evidence as to the intent of the Framers, which would
suggest to the slightest degree that it was intended to render alienage a 'suspect' classification, that it was designed in any way to protect 'discrete and insular minorities' other than
racial minorities, or that it would in any way justify the result reached by the Court." Id. at
649-50; In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (Rehnquist dissenting from this companion
case to Sugarman in which the Court struck down Connecticut's exclusion of aliens from
the practice of law as violative of equal protection).
58. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977), in which Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's holding that an Illinois law permitting illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from their mothers, but not their fathers, was unconstitutional
as contrary to the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972), Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's determination
that Louisiana's statutory denial of equal recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged illegitimates was constitutionally impermissible, on the ground that rational basis, not strict
scrutiny, should have been the standard used. "All legislation involves classification and line
drawing of one kind or another. When this Court expands the traditional 'reasonable basis'
standard for judgment under the Equal Protection Clause into a search for 'legitimate' state
interest that the legislation may 'promote,' and 'for fundamental personal rights' that it
might 'endanger,' it is doing nothing less than passing policy judgments upon the acts of
every state legislature in the country." Id. at 185.
59. "The paramount reason [for the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] was to amend the Constitution so as to overrule explicitly the Dred Scott decision."
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

106

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:93

cousin of race."60 Justice Rehnquist believes that if legislative classifications not based on race or national origin are found to have a
rational basis, then any change in the legislation is a political question to be left to the legislature and the people, not the Court.6 1
Although the rules of statutory construction, for Justice Rehnquist, are not identical to those of constitutional construction,62 his
textualism is still evident. In construing the language of a statute,
the Justice analyzes it in the same manner as the language of the
Constitution. He looks to find whether the language used is specific
or general. If the language is specific, it must be followed to the
letter as it was understood by those who wrote it. If the language is
general, it must be read consistently with prior decisions, and
within the confines of the intent of the authors.
60. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Justice Rehnquist sees judicial self-restraint as an implied, if not an express, condition of the grant of authority of judicial review. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239, 470
(1972). He therefore has sought to limit access to the courts on both constitutional and
statutory grounds. See, e.g., Absence of "Case or Controversy": Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976). Lack of Standing: Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 290 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Socialist Labor Party v.
Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972). Absence of State Action: Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Statutory Grounds:
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S.
554, 573 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 591 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part); Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320
(1972). But see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
Although Justice Rehnquist is a judicial and political conservative, he is not an institutional conservative. His judicial conservatism has been faced with the fruits of the judicial
activist Warren Court, and this has led him to overrule a number of past precedents: National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968)); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (overruling Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665,
692 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgments) (arguing O'Callahan v. Parker, 395
U.S. 258 (1969), should be overruled).
62. It is Justice Relhquist's view that a constitutional holding is open to re-examination to a greater extent than a question of statutory construction. See, e.g., Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Edelnan v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 671 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In his nomination hearings, Justice Rehnquist took the position that, with respect to statutory construction, stare decisis should be given great weight because Congress
may change the statute if it determines that the Court misinterpreted congressional intent.
On the other hand, with respect to constitutional construction, Justice Rehnquist felt there
should be a greater tendency to review prior holdings, since the Court's decision could only
be otherwise changed by a constitutional amendment. Hearings on the Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Nominations Hearings].
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To Justice Rehnquist's mind, the Supreme Court in United
Steelworkers v. Weber 6s breached these rules of construction as
clearly as it had broken the rules of constitutional construction in
the equal protection cases. In Weber, the majority of the justices
held that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act," does not prohibit
all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans. Justice Rehnquist stated that in so holding, the Court confronted and
contradicted "clear statutory language,"6 5 went beyond allowable
limits of embellishing legislative intent, 6 and interpreted the law
in a manner wholly inconsistent with the Court's prior decisions.6 7
In his dissent, the Justice analyzed the precise language of the
statute 8 and assayed the intent of Congress by studying the legislative history. It was his conclusion that Congress, in passing Title
VII, outlawed all racial discrimination.
The majority, however, made use of a more liberal rule of construction which states that ameliorative legislation is to be broadly
interpreted by invoking the spirit of that legislation. For Justice
Rehnquist, the "spirit" invoked was clearly in conflict with the intent of the legislators.
Our task in this case, like any other case involving the construction of a statute, is to give effect to the intent of Congress.
To divine that intent, we traditionally look first to the words of
the statute and, if they are unclear, then to the statute's legislative history. Finding the desired result hopelessly foreclosed by
these conventional sources, the Court turns to a third source-the
'spirit' of the Act. But close examination of what the Court proffers as the spirit of the Act reveals it as the spirit animating the
present majority, not the 88th Congress. For if the spirit of the
Act eludes the cold words of the statute itself, it rings out with
unmistakable clarity in the words of the elected representative
who made the Act law.69
63.

443 U.S. 193 (1979).

64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
65. 443 U.S. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. "[O]ur duty is to construe rather than rewrite legislation." Id. at 221 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
67. "Our statements in Griggs and Furnco Construction, patently inconsistent with
today's holding, are not even mentioned, much less distinguished, by the Court." Id. at 221
n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. "Congress fully understood what it was saying and meant precisely what it said."
Id. 252 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 253-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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As will be discussed below, however, Justice Rehnquist's mode
of analyzing First Amendment problems takes factors other than
language into account.
Justice Rehnquist's Contextual Approach to First
Amendment Speech
In contrast to the rigid textualism of his approach in most
cases involving statutory and constitutional construction, Justice
Rehnquist utilizes a contextual approach to First Amendment interpretation. He analyzes the protection of free expression according to the context in which the expression takes place. The labor
context is one of many in which Justice Rehnquist and the Court
have developed special restrictions on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
This contextual approach considers not only the environment
in which the expression takes place, but also the parties and the
type of expression involved. This "sliding scale" approach to the
First Amendment has been employed in a variety of situations by
the Court, which has devised special rules applicable to each.
Though Justice Rehnquist many times joins or concurs in these
decisions, he tends to prefer a standard of review less likely to result in First Amendment protection. 0
Justice Rehnquist's limited regard for First Amendment rights
was well documented even before he assumed his place on the
Court. 1 Since that time, his view of the First Amendment has
70.

See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), in which the

Justice seems to have used a rational basis test to denounce as unconstitutional a West
Virginia statute which punished the truthful publication by a newspaper of the lawfully
obtained name of an alleged juvenile delinquent. Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist stated that he could not take very seriously West Virginia's asserted need to
protect the anonymity of its youthful offenders when it permitted the electronic media to
distribute the information without fear of punishment. Id. at 110. He did not agree with the
Court's finding that only a state interest of the "highest order" could justify such legislative
action. Id.
71. "When it comes to dealing with civil liberties, Mr. Rehnquist uniformly takes a
position which reflects the low value he places upon concerns of equality and individual
freedom. He consistently gives these concerns far less weight than that which they are entitled by their high place in the Constitution of the United States and their vital role in the
fabric of contemporary American society." SENATE JUDICIARY COMm. NOMINATION OF WLLIAM H. REHNQUIST, S. ExEc. REP. No. 92-16, 92nd Cong., lst Sess., at 44 (1971) (minority

report).
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72
been made all too clear.

Justice Rehnquist adheres, in his First Amendment philosophy, to the utilitarian rather than the individualist theory of free
speech. A person's right to speak exists because of the benefits accruing to society, not because that right is essential to an individual's integrity or personal development. Therefore, the needs of society are heavily favored when balanced against an individual's
First Amendment rights. Since societal benefit provides the basis
for an individual's rights, the government interest, representing
that of society, will generally take precedence.7 3

This is especially true in the area of state law. Justice Rehnquist is of the opinion that not all of the strictures of the First
Amendment imposed upon Congress are incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 "Given this view, cases which deal with state
restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are not fungible with
those which deal with restrictions imposed by the Federal
Government." 5
The government, in the role of proprietor, has been allowed
greater freedom to regulate expression than it has as a lawmaker.
This is particularly true of the government as a school administrator. Speech in schools has had a special status since the Supreme
Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
6 where the Court held
School District,"
that prohibition of expression is constitutionally permissible when it is "necessary to avoid
material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline.
72.

77

The Court thereby applied the First Amendment in light

"It is quite possible, at least in the philosophic sense, to believe thoroughly in the

right of free speech, but to have a good deal of doubt about its usefulness." Rehnquist,
Civility and Freedom of Speech, 49 IND. L:J. 1, 2 (1973).
73.

See Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12

GONZ. L. REv. 1 (1976).
74. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), which imposed the First Amendment on
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, is to be limited, according to Justice Rehn-

quist, to its factual setting, which involved speech that incited criminal conduct. It is this
limitation which aids the Justice in his contextual approach. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See also Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 725
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the First Amendment does not prohibit a state from permitting its civil courts to settle religious property disputes).

76. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
77. Id. at 511.
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of the special circumstances of the school environment. This "material and substantial interference" standard is in marked contrast
to the "clear and present danger" test 8 which is generally used in
cases dealing with constitutionally protected speech.79
This conflict between the clear and present danger test and
the particularized test of the school environment again reached the
Court in Healey v. James,80 in which the denial, by the president
of a state-supported college, of official recognition to a student organization which desired to become a chapter of the Students for a
Democratic Society was challenged. Although the Court applied
the Tinker81 test and found that the student organization did not
pose a "substantial threat of material disruption,

' 82

Justice Rehn-

quist, in a concurring opinion, took pains to point out that cases
such as Brandenburg,dealing with criminal sanctions, were probably inapplicable to special settings such as the academic environment.88 He further stated that school administrators could impose
"reasonable regulations" which would be impermissible if imposed
on society in general.8
This constitutional distinction between criminal punishment
and administrative or disciplinary sanctions was again drawn by
78. Though originally articulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919), and definitively stated by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), the current clear and present danger test was
adopted by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). A state may
not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action." Id. at 447.
79. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
80. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
81. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
82. 408 U.S. at 189.
83. Id. at 202 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080
(1978). Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's denial of certiorariin a case concerning a university's refusal to formally recognize a pro-homosexual group as a campus organization. The university based its refusal on the ground that recognition of the group would
likely result in imminent violations of state sodomy laws. The Justice held the opinion that
homosexuality, which he insinuated may be contagious, constituted a danger which "may be
particularly acute in the university setting where many students are still coping with the
sexual problems which accompany late adolescence and early adulthood." Id. at 1083. The
speech and conduct presented by the pro-homosexual group, which, he concluded, had a
propensity to induce action prohibited by the criminal laws, "may surely be placed off limits
of a university campus without doing violence to the First or Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
at 1085.
84. 408 U.S. at 203 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result).
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the Justice in his dissent in Papish v. Board of Curators of the
University of Missouri.8 5 The Court, in a per curiam opinion, held
that disciplinary sanctions imposed on students because of their
distribution of a newspaper containing "indecent speech" on campus, were unconstitutional. Justice Rehnquist argued that because
the student's expulsion was an administrative sanction, the Court
should have upheld the Board's decision."
This distinction between criminal and noncriminal sanctions
was again refused by the Court in Communist Party v. Whitcomb.817 In striking down a state loyalty oath requirement as unconstitutionally overbroad, the Court reaffirmed that Brandenburg
is to be applied in noncriminal sanction cases.
The second argument made by Justice Rehnquist in Healey,
that the government, in certain special settings, may impose restrictions on speech which would be impermissible if imposed on
all citizens, has been invoked in other contexts. 8
The Justice's view that the government acting as a proprietor
can proscribe conduct which it cannot proscribe as a lawgiver, did
not prove persuasive in Flower v. United States,"9 where the Court
sustained the right to engage in orderly First Amendment activity
on "open" military bases which are not otherwise off-limits to the
85. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
86. Id. at 673 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Of special note here is Justice Rehnquist's
concern for the offensive nature of the language used by the students in their newspaper.
Although the regulation of "offensive" words has been prohibited since the Supreme Court's
decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), Justice Rehnquist, along with Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, has sought to proscribe the use of language which he
finds not obscene, but offensive. Relying on the dicta of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942), which states that lewd, obscene or profane language was without constitutional protection, the Justice has continually dissented from decisions which have
granted protection to such language. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972);
Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (Justice Rehnquist, joining Chief Justice Burger's dissent which criticized the prohibition of content regulation as adding "nothing to First Amendment analysis and sacrific[ing] legitimate state interests." 422 U.S. at
224. But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), where a plurality,
including Justice Rehnquist, upheld a content regulation contained in a city zoning ordinance which regulated theaters showing non-obscene "adult" motion pictures.
87. 414 U.S. 441 (1974).
88. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977)
(prisons); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military bases); American Radio Ass'n v.
Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974) (wrongful interference with employment); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (armed forces).
89. 407 U.S. 197 (1972).
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general public. In his dissent, the Justice suggested that the governmental interest in the effective operation of a military base was
sufficient to justify restrictions on the First Amendment."0 This position was later adopted in Greer v. Spock,9 1 where the Court held
that the government could refuse to permit citizens to hold a political meeting on a military base. 2
The special mission of the military has also provided a basis
for a special standard of review for military speech. The Brandenburg standard has also been held to be inapposite in the military
context. The Court has found that the dependence on a command
structure within the armed forces, which ultimately involves the
security of the nation, requires that speech which undermines the
effectiveness of that structure may be regulated more severely than
speech within the civilian community. In Parker v. Levy," the
leading Supreme Court decision on military free speech, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, upheld the conviction by court-

martial of an army physician who had urged enlisted personnel to
refuse to obey orders to go to Vietnam. In the decision, Justice
Rehnquist noted that even revolutionary advocacy is tolerable
under the Brandenburg test in the civilian community, because it

does not directly affect the government in the discharge of its re90. Id. at 199 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This opinion reflects the "pragmatic" view of
civil liberties which the Justice had shown as the Assistant United States Attorney General
during the May Day demonstrations in Washington, D.C., and the ensuing field arrests. See
Nominations Hearings,supra note 62,. at 43-47.
91. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
92. Id. at 838. This notion that free speech may be regulated more strictly when the
government is acting as a proprietor has also been invoked by Justice Rehnquist in the
context of free speech within prisons. In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977), a prisoners' labor union brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
asserting that its First Amendment rights were violated by regulations promulgated by the
North Carolina Department of Correction that prohibited prisoners from soliciting other
inmates to join the union from outside sources. Citing Greer v. Spock, Justice Rehnquist
held that "[a] prison may be no more easily converted into a public forum than a military
base." 433 U.S. at 134. Therefore, the prison officials need only demonstrate a rational basis
for their regulations.
The rational basis standard used by Justice Rehnquist was significantly less stringent
than the standard which has generally been used in the prison speech context. In Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), the Supreme Court held, with Justice Rehnquist in the
majority, that prison regulations restricting freedom of speech are to be upheld if: (1) the
regulation or practice in question furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests in security, order and rehabilitation, and (2) the limitation on First Amendment
rights is no greater thai's necessary to protect the particular governmental interest involved. Id. at 413.
93. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
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sponsibilities. However, the armed forces depend on a system of
command that at times must commit men to combat, thereby placing both individual lives and the national security in jeopardy.
Therefore, it was held that, under the circumstances, protecting
such advocacy must be viewed differently.
While members of the military are not excluded from the
protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for
imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside
94
it.

This contextual approach also takes into account the employer
capacity in which the government may act. The government as
sovereign and lawgiver is to be treated differently than the government as employer; the government may, as an employer, prescribe
conditions of employment which might be constitutionally unacceptable if enacted as standards of conduct applicable to the entire
citizenry.95
Justice Rehnquist is more concerned with the practicalities
and efficient operation of government than he is with individual
rights. This predisposition has surfaced in the various contexts in
which he and the Court have considered speech regulation. He has
concern for the individual only so far as the individual affects the
system of governance. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
context of public employee free speech.
Even prior to Justice Rehnquist's tenure, the Court indicated
that it might be willing to limit the First Amendment rights of
public employees in certain contexts. In Pickering v. Board of Education,9 6 the Court considered a case in which a teacher was dismissed for writing and publishing a letter in a newspaper criticizing the Board's allocation of school funds. The teacher's dismissal
was affirmed in the state courts, but the Supreme Court reversed,
94. Id. at 758. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force regulations requiring prior approval by base commanders of petitions to be circulated on Air Force
bases as protecting a substantial governmental interest in maintaining the respect for duty
and discipline necessary for military effectiveness).
95. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 290 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
96. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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holding that although some of the statements in the letter had
been shown to be false, when the statements made by the teacher
involved matters of public importance, the proper test was that applicable in general to defamatory statements made by citizens
against public officials. The Court was careful to distinguish between the teacher as public citizen, and the teacher as employee.
At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in
any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
97
employees.
After the Court found that the teacher had been acting in the
position of citizen, it added:
We are thus not presented with a situation in which a teacher has
carelessly made false statements about matters so closely related
to the day-to-day operations of the schools that any harmful impact on the public would be difficult to counter because of the
teacher's presumed greater access to the real facts. Accordingly,
we have no occasion to consider at this time whether under such
circumstances a school board could reasonably require that a
teacher make substantial efforts to verify the accuracy of his
charges before publishing them.98
If the speech does not pertain to a matter of public concern
and disrupts the work environment or interferes with working relationships, it is no longer given full First Amendment protection.
The government is then allowed to react to the speech as an employer. 99 Therefore, if speech is detrimental to the efficient operation of the government, it may discharge the employee as a result
of the speech. 100
As is easily seen, however, there is a possibility of overlap with
the present definitions of employee speech. The Court has not yet
been faced with speech by a public employee which both pertained
to matters of public conern and caused a disruption of the govern97.
98.
99.

100.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 570.

Rehnquist, supra note 73, at 12.
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mental work force. This will undoubtedly force the Court to evaluate the use of the "matters of public concern" criteria. Such a re-

evaluation of criteria in the libel law area has resulted in a series of
confusing Court decisions. 10 1
The Pickering test has been adhered to by Justice Rehnquist
in his decisions concerning public employee speech. In City of
Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission,10 2 he joined in the Court's decision which

found that a nonunion teacher, who spoke at a regularly scheduled
open meeting of the board of education, was speaking "as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views on an important decision of his government"103 when he discussed pending labor negotiations between the school board and the teachers' union and the
undesirability of a "fair share" clause, which would have required
all teachers to pay union dues regardless of their membership status. The teachers' union had filed a complaint with the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission, alleging that the school board,
in allowing the teacher to speak at the meeting, was "negotiating"
with an individual other than the employee's exclusive collectivebargaining representative, which was a prohibited labor practice.
The Court rejected this contention, holding that "[r]egardless of
the extent to which true contract negotations between a public
body and its employees may be regulated-an issue we need not
consider at this time-the participation in public discussioi of
public business cannot be confined to one category of interested
individuals.' 1

04

Thus the Court and Justice Rehnquist were ac-

knowledging that free speech of public employees might be context-sensitive.
In the most recent of the Pickering line of cases, Givhan v.
101. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), in which the Court disavowed the "public interest" subject matter approach to applying the New York Times constitutional malice rule, for a "public figure" status approach, due, at least in part, to a difficulty of defining "matter of public interest."
102. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
103. Id. at 175.
104. Id. See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977) (Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a school board's decision not to rehire a public school teacher would be upheld if the board could show it would
have reached the same decision even in the absence of protected conduct); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (the nonrenewal of
nontenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be based on the exercise of
First Amendment rights).
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Western"Line Consolidated Schodi District,1 5 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, held that, a public school teacher could not
be dismissed from her employment for private communications she
had with her principal concerning discriminatory employment policies and practices at the school where she was employed. The mere
fact that a public employee decides to express her views privately
rather than publicly was held not to lessen the extent of First
Amendment protection.1 0 6
Justice Rehnquist's concern for government efficiency is again
apparent in the position he has taken in public employee cases
dealing with political patronage. In Elrod v. Burns,10 7 Justice
Rehnquist joined in Justice Powell's dissent.10 8 The plurality decision had enjoined a county sheriff's office from discharging noncivil service employees for the sole reason that they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party. The plurality
found that patronage dismissals severely restrict political belief
and association, and therefore violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.1 09
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion first questioned whether
there was a constitutional question at all. The employees had accepted the patronage jobs with full knowledge of the "tenure"
practices of the sheriff's office. "Such employees have benefited
from their political beliefs and activities; they have not been penalized for them."11 0
The constitutional argument of the plurality was also found by
the dissenters to have seriously underestimated the strength of the
governmental interest in allowing patronage hiring practices, while
exaggerating the perceived burdens on First Amendment rights.
Justice Powell argued that the patronage system helps make the
government accountable by stimulating political activity and by
strengthening parties, especially in local areas where election campaigns for lesser offices generally attract little attention from the
media or the public. 1 Any pressure brought to bear on public em105.

439 U.S. 410 (1979).

106. Id. at 414.
107.

427 U.S. 347 (1976).

108. Id. at 376 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 372-73.
110. Id. at 380 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
111.

Id. at 382-85.
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ployees to abandon their beliefs and associations, to secure government employment, was deemed
permissible in light of the govern11 2
served.
interests
mental
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,13 Justice Rehnquist
concurred in the Court's opinion which he believed was contrary to
the plurality opinion in Elrod v. Burns.1 14 The Court, in Abood,
held that public school teachers who were not members of the majority-approved union could be required to pay a service charge to
the union for expenditures essential to the collective bargaining
process in matters of bargaining, contract administration and
grievance adjustment.
The Justice read this decision as allowing the regulation of the
nonmembers' political beliefs, as collective bargaining activities of
public employees' unions inevitably touch upon political concerns.
"I am unable to see a constitutional distinction between a governmentally imposed requirement that a public employee be a Democrat or Republican or else lose his job, and a similar requirement
that a public employee contribute
to the collective-bargaining ex11 5
union.
labor
a
of
penses
Justice Rehnquist again joined in Justice Powell's dissent in
Branti v. Finkel, 1 6 in which a majority of the Court held that two
Assistant Public Defenders, who were neither policymakers nor
confidential employees, could not be discharged from their positions solely because of their political beliefs. In addition to reiterating the arguments stated in Elrod, that patronage appointments
help build continuing stable political parties through the use of a
reward system and aid governmental accountability, Justice Powell
maintained that government hiring practices are traditionally matters of legislative and executive discretion and should remain so.
"Federal judges will now be the final arbiters as to who federal,
state and local governments may employ. In my view, the Court is
not justified in removing decisions so essential to responsible and
efficient governance from the discretion of legislative and executive
officials.'1 1 7 Such sensitive political judgments, it was argued,
112. Id. at 388.
113. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
114.

Id. at 242 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

115. Id. at 243-44 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
116. 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980).
117.

Id. at 1298 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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"should be left to the voters and to elected representatives of the
people."118
In the labor context there exists an established governmental
interest in preserving industrial peace via a national policy of labor-management relations. Though Justice Rehnquist is at times
uneasy with the extent of that policy's impact on state law,119 he
views this settled government interest as providing a substantial
basis for the regulation of speech.
Justice Rehnquist's first labor opinion to touch upon First
Amendment speech interests, Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Association,1 20 did not address the issue. 21 The case in-

volved foreign-flag shipowners and agents who had sought injunctive relief in a Texas state court to bar the picketing of their
vessels by American unions protesting the substandard wages being paid to foreign crew members who manned the vessels. The
Supreme Court, with Justice Rehnquist writing the opinion for the
majority, held that the union's activities did not constitute activity
"affecting commerce. 1 122 Therefore, federal labor law was not ap-

plicable and the Texas courts erred in holding that they were prevented from hearing the injunction suit.
Since the majority found there to be no federal jurisdiction, it
did not reach the question presented by the unions' First and
Fourteenth Amendment defenses. Though the dissent, written by
Justice Brennan, directed the state court on remand to adhere to
the Supreme Court's decisions in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
118. Id. at 1303.
119. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra. But see Carey v. Brown, 100 S. Ct.
2286, 2296 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority's decision which found unconstitutional, under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an Illinois statute which prohibited the picketing of residences or
dwellings, but exempted the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor
dispute and meeting or assembly places on premises commonly used to discuss subjects of
general public interest. The Justice argued that the statute constituted a permissible place
restriction, not a content control, and therefore constitutionally furthered the state's interest in protecting residential privacy.
120. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
121. This is in agreement with Justice Rehnquist's view that federal courts should not
resolve cases on the basis of constitutional questions when a non-constitutional ground
might be available. See United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 36 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the result); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 162 (1974); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 70, 415 U.S. 423 (1974).
122. 415 U.S. at 105-06. See also note 33 and accompanying text supra.
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Packers, Local 76023 and Thornhill v. Alabama,124 which provide
for First Amendment protection in union picketing, it did not
mention the majority's failure to discuss the First Amendment
issues.
The decision in Windward Shipping was soon affirmed by
Justice Rehnquist in American Radio Association v. Mobile
Steamship Association,125 a case concerning the same unions engaging in the same conduct as in Windward, in an action brought
in an Alabama court to enjoin the picketing of a foreign flag ship
for substandard wages.
The Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, held that
neither the shipper, the stevedores, nor the unions were "engaged
in or affecting commerce" within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act. Therefore, the picketing did not even "arguably" constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4) of the
Act, its secondary boycott provision. The Court found that the
state court had exercised its proper jurisdiction.126
In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist held that the state court injunction did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendment rights
of the picketers. Citing InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,
Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.

27

as an enunciation of a balancing test in

picketing cases, he proceeded to discuss the competing interests of
protected speech and state policy.
The Justice analyzed the union's picketing as "speech-plus"
conduct, involving more than mere "publicity." It signals a coercive situation which is a message greater than that printed on the
picket itself. The act of picketing then becomes a form of symbolic
speech which can be regulated in a stricter fashion than "pure"
123. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
124. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
125. 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
126. Id. at 228.
127. 354 U.S. 284 (1957). Vogt was also relied upon in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980). Justice Rehnquist joined the Court's majority

opinion which held that secondary picketing against a struck product, which predictably
encourages consumers to boycott a neutral party's business, is prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). The cursory dismissal by the majority of First Amendment concerns, reminiscent of Justice Rebnquist's

summary consideration of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of picketers in
Windward and Mobile Steamship, was declaimed by Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion. 100 S. Ct. at 2378 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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128

In addition to the governmental interest in peaceful labor-

management relations, Justice Rehnquist found that the state has
an interest in preserving its economy against the stagnation which

may result from picketing which disrupts the businesses of employers with whom the picketers have no primary dispute. Using

the Vogt analysis, the Justice held that "the State may prefer
these interests over petitioners' interests in conveying their 'ship
American' message through the "speech-plus' device of dockside
'129
picketing.

Once again, by using a standard less stringent than that required in matters concerning the public in general-in this case a

simple balancing test which emphasizes the state interest instead
of the traditional O'Brien test'3-Justice Rehnquist has restricted
speech according to its particular context.

First Amendment concerns in the traditional labor law cases
are many times in conflict with state protected property interests.

These cases therefore present a situation where Justice Rehnquist's concerns for federalism and property interests are joined

with his dispassion for free speech interests. In Justice Rehnquist's
jurisprudential universe, property rights take priority over First
Amendment rights."3
Thus, in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 3 2 Justice Rehnquist, in dis128. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which held that "speech plus"
conduct may be regulated if (1) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, (2) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (3)
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377. This test forms the basis of many of the
contextual tests cited earlier.
129. 419 U.S. at 231.
130. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See note 128 supra.
131. During his confirmation hearings, Justice Rehnquist made the following statement concerning his views on property rights: "I certainly am not prepared to say, as a
matter of personal philosophy, that property rights are necessarily at the bottom of the
scale. Justice Jackson, for whom I worked, commented shortly before his death that the
Framers had chosen to join together life, liberty, and property, and he did not feel they
should be separated. I think property rights are actually a very important form of individual
rights. On the other hand, I am by no means prepared to say that a property right must not
on some occasion-and I am again speaking personally and not in any sense of the Constitution or statutory construction-but certainly when a legislative decision is made that a
property right must give way to what may be called a human right or an individual right,
that may frequently be the correct choice." Nominations Hearings, supra note 62, at 77.
132. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
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sent,1 33 argued that the language of section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act conclusively shows that a union's attempted distribution of a union newsletter-which urged employees to oppose
incorporation of a state right-to-work statute into a revised state
constitution, and criticized a presidential veto of an increase in the
federal minimum wage-was not protected "concerted activity"
under the "mutual aid or protection" clause of that section.
With an analysis of the National Labor Relations Act which
was reminiscent of his equal protection analysis,1 3 ' Justice Rehnquist stated:
It may be that Congress has power under the Commerce Clause
to require an employer to open his property to such political advocacy, but, if Congress intended to do so, "such a legislative intention should be found in some definite and unmistakable expression." [citation omitted] Finding no such expression in the
Act, I would not permit the Board to balance away petitioner's
right to exclude political literature from its property.135
The property interest involved in Eastex cannot be regulated,
according to the Justice, unless a definite and unmistakable congressional intent to do so is found. Justice Rehnquist emphasized
that the state law of trespass should be applied, allowing the property owner to determine what political advocacy he would admit
onto his property.
The Justice found that, traditionally, the Court had recognized the weight of an employer's property rights which are "explicitly" protected from "federal interference" by the Fifth
Amendment. "The Court has not been quick to conclude in a given
instance that Congress has authorized the displacement of those
3 86
rights by the federally created rights of the employees."
It was acknowledged that this protection of employer property
rights allowed for two exceptions. Under the first, property rights
of employers could be displaced where necessary to accommodate
the rights of employees to distribute union organizational literature and to wear union insignia. Under the second exception, nonemployees could also invoke the right of self-organization to solicit
union membership, but the National Labor Relations Board's au133. Id. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134. See notes 56-62 and accompanying text supra.
135. 437 U.S. at 583 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 580.
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thority to displace the employer's property rights in such circumstances was extremely limited.
Justice Rehnquist, citing a footnote from the Court's opinion
in Hudgens v. NLRB,3 7 in which he had joined, found there to be
a substantial difference in employer rights depending on the character of the person carrying out the organizational activity."" If
the activity is by employees, then the employer's managerial interests are involved, as the employees are already rightfully on the
employer's property. However, if the organizational activity is conducted by nonemployees, a different balance is struck because the
employer's property rights are now involved. When property rights
are involved, the right of self-organization, guaranteed by federal
statutory law, is very limited when balanced against the constitu137. 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 n.10 (1976).
138. This prioritization of constitutional rights according to the characterization of the
actor is a view taken by Justice Rehnquist in the area of corporate free speech as well. In
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), the Justice
categorizes corporations into three types: (1) media corporations, (2) political corporations,
and (3) economic corporations. He would vary the amount of protection given to corporate
speech according to which type of corporation is speaking. See Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Justice Rehnquist partially joining Justice Blackmun's dissent in cases prohibiting the regulation of political inserts in utility bills). This categorization-in addition to his varying scrutiny of
speech content in commercial speech, see, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2360 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), and offensive speech, see, e.g., note 86 supra-indicates the broadening of Justice Rehnquist's contextual approach to the First Amendment. In a recent non-labor case,
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980), the Court was faced with
issues which were the mirror-image of those expressed in Eastex, pitting state rights of free
expression and petition against federal property rights. In Pruneyard,the Court affirmed a
California Supreme Court decision which held that the distribution of pamphlets and the
circulation of petitions concerning a United Nations resolution against "Zionism" by high
school students were activities protected by the California Constitution, even in privately
owned shopping centers.
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist found that California had a sovereign right to
"adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by
the Federal Constitution." Id. at 4652. The Justice's fundamental concern for property
rights, which was so forcefully expressed in Eastex, was minimized when in conflict with his
notion of an elevated state position in the federal constitutional framework. Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), were distinguished by the fact that no state-created right to use of private property by strangers existed in those cases.
The exercise of the state-protected rights of free expression and petition on the shopping center property was held neither to constitute an unconstitutional infringement of the
shopping center owner's property rights under the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment,
nor a violation of the property owner's First Amendment rights.
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tional property right of the employer. In Justice Rehnquist's eyes,
the rights of the organizers are based on statute alone. First
Amendment protection of free expression does not enter into the
balance.
Justice Rehnquist's position, therefore, was that the intrusion
on the property rights of the property owner was not minimal at
all, as was claimed by the majority. The required opening of the
private property of an employer to political advocacy was deemed
to be a contravention of Fifth Amendment property rights which
should not fall before the First Amendment rights of
nonemployees.
Conclusion
Justice Rehnquist, due to his concern for the states' role in the
federal system and for basic property rights, has consistently undermined the protection of First Amendment speech. Through the
use of his extreme contextual approach to the regulation of speech,
he has placed too great an emphasis on the protection of the corresponding governmental interests arising in the various contexts. At
the same time, his selective textualism has attempted to raise
property rights to a pre-eminent position in the constitutional
scheme. As a result the freedom of speech, which traditionally has
occupied that position, is endangered.

